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T h er o l eo fc u r r e n ta c c o u n td e ﬁcits and a country’s net foreign asset position for macroeco-
nomic stability is a subject of ongoing debate. Traditionally, the intertemporal optimizing
view of the current account (as summarized in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1996) has been inter-
preted as implying that foreign debt accumulation should not be seen as a macroeconomic
problem since it reﬂects optimal consumption smoothing over time. However, this view
is being debated in the literature on currency crises (see the survey in Edwards, 2002)
mainly on empirical grounds. The recent theoretical literature featuring the intertemporal
optimizing model coupled with short-run nominal price rigidities, often referred to as the
‘New open economy macroeconomics’ (see Lane, 2001) tends to avoid explicit modelling
of foreign assets, presumably because its consideration can lead to indeterminacy of the
steady state and unit root dynamics which defy the study of local equilibrium dynamics
based on log-linear approximations. Thus, current account dynamics are often excluded by
using speciﬁc assumptions on preferences or the structure of asset markets (e.g. Corsetti
and Pesenti, 2000, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2002).
The present paper combines elements from both strands of the literature in analyzing
t h er o l eo fn e tf o r e i g na s s e t sf o rm a c r o e c o n o m i cs t a b i l i t yi na ni n d e b t e ds m a l lo p e ne c o n -
omy with short-run price stickiness. We derive the conditions under which a central bank
that sets the short-run nominal interest rate on domestic debt ensures stability in the
sense that explosive or self-fulﬁlling equilibria are prevented from occuring. Interest rate
setting rules in the presence of current account dynamics have also recently been studied
by Cavallo and Ghironi (2002). They use an overlapping generations model and derive
the welfare properties of Taylor (1993)-style rules. The stability analysis carried out in
the present paper can be seen as complementary to their welfare analysis, although the
reason why net foreign assets matter is diﬀerent here.
In accordance with empirical evidence that international interest rate diﬀerentials re-
ﬂect the distribution of net foreign assets (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001), we assume an
asset market imperfection that consists of the risk that residents of the home country may
default on their external debt obligations with a probability that depends positively on
the stock of foreign debt. There is thus a default risk premium on domestic interest rates
(similar to Turnovski, 1997) that prevents the standard uncovered interest rate parity
condition from being fulﬁlled. As a consequence, a real depreciation lowers the average
real return on domestic bonds due to the implied increase in foreign indebtedness, and
thus in the probability of default. Given that arbitrage freeness requires a future appre-
ciation in this situation, the real exchange rate will return to its steady state over time.
This is what is required to prevent the real value of debt from exploding. However, this
1stabilizing debt feedback mechanism can be disturbed by the central bank’s interest rate
setting policy. A depreciated real exchange rate will be associated high aggregate demand
and thus rising inﬂation. If the central bank aims to target inﬂation using a simple Tay-
lor (1993)-style rule with a high coeﬃcient on inﬂation, it will then raise the real return
on domestic bonds, which in equilibrium is associated with a future real exchange rate
depreciation, and thus future growth in inﬂation and real foreign debt. Thus, a central
bank behavior which is known to result in a uniquely determined and stable equilibrium in
closed economy models (Clarida et al., 2000; Benhabib et al., 2001, Woodford, 2001), or in
open economy models where perfect capital markets imply that interest bearing assets are
irrelevant for the determination of output and inﬂation (Linnemann and Schabert, 2001),
can entail explosiveness in the model presented here, even for a very slight dependence of
default risk on debt.
Based on these results, it can be conjectured that the net foreign asset position can
potentially be a useful monetary policy indicator, in that a policy which takes the infor-
mation content of foreign assets in this model into consideration might be able to target
inﬂation and at the same time to avoid destabilizing the economy via the aforementioned
debt spiral. In particular, we show that the central bank can restore macroeconomic sta-
bility — in the sense of a saddle stable equilibrium path — even for highly inﬂation-reactive
interest rate policies, if it lowers the nominal interest rate in face of an increase in foreign
debt. Put diﬀerently, central bank actually raises the likelihood that the economy is set
on an explosive debt path if it tackles higher foreign debt by a contractionary monetary
policy measure. Thus, the analysis presented in this paper reveals the potential stability
gain of considering the current account dynamics for a central bank, which actively aims
to target macroeconomic variables such as inﬂation and output through its interest rate
policy. Alternatively, our results imply that an interest rate peg — which in many models is
found to be associated with indeterminacy of prices and real aggregates — can be a sensible
strategy for a central bank which predominantly fears the emergence of a debt crisis.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. In section 3, we
examine the local dynamics of the model allowing for perfect and imperfect asset markets.
Section 4 shows how foreign debt as an monetary policy indicator alters the results. Section
5 concludes.
2 The model
The model extends a continuous time version of a small open economy model with stag-
gered prices closely related to Parrado and Velasco (2002), Gali and Monacelli (2002),
and Kollmann (2001). Following the former, we assume that there is an integrated world
asset market that allows consumption risk to be shared internationally. However, the asset
2market is imperfect in the sense that there is an uninsurable risk of capital loss due to
debtor default associated with holding domestic bonds. The crucial assumption is that
the risk of domestic debtors defaulting on their bonds is increasing in the level of external
indebtedness.
Time arguments are suppressed wherever possible to lighten the notation. Lower case
letters denote real variables, upper case letters denote nominal variables. A dot over a
variable denotes a time derivative, a bar over a variable denotes a steady state value.
Asterisks are used to mark foreign variables. The subscript H (F) characterizes variables
of home (foreign) origin. Thus, for example, cF means consumption of foreign goods at
home (i.e., imports); while PF denotes their price (in home currency) at home, P∗
F is the
corresponding foreign currency price. The small open economy assumption implies, among
other things, that starred variables are exogenous to the home economy.
Households The economy is populated by a continuum of identical and inﬁnitely lived
households of measure one. Households’ instantaneous utility u is deﬁned over consump-









dt, ρ > 0, σ > 0, γ ≥ 1, (1)
where c is consumption, and l is labor supply. Households are endowed with an initial
stock of nominal ﬁnancial wealth A0 > 0. They have access to two types of assets:
domestic currency denominated bonds, B,w h i c ha r eo fi n ﬁnitesimal maturity and pay
a risky nominal return R, and foreign currency denominated bonds, where B denotes
the stock of foreign bonds held by domestic residents. The average probability that a
domestic householddefaults on its bond emissions is δ(d) ∈ (0,1),w h e r ed ≡ D/P and D
is aggregate nominal external debt and P is the consumption based priced level. External
debt is deﬁned as net foreign liabilities, i.e. domestic bonds held by foreigners (called Bf)
less foreign bonds held by domestic residents, eB, where e is the nominal exchange rate.




= bf − xb, (2)





is the real exchange rate. As an implication of the assumption that the home country
is a small economy, we assume that Bf is of a negligible magnitude, and use d = −xb
henceforth. It is assumed that δ0(d) ≥ 0, and the analysis is limited to the case of
d>0 ⇔ b < 0 to exclude corner solutions.
3When making his optimal decisions, each household takes d, which is an economywide
aggregate variable, as given and constant, although in the aggregate d will be determined
endogenously by the optimal choices of all households. The ﬂow budget constraint is
e ˙ B + ˙ B = Pwl+ PκH + eR∗B + R[1 − δ(d)]B − Pc,
or in terms of real ﬁnancial wealth a ≡ A/P with A ≡ B + eB,
˙ a = {R[1 − δ(d)] − π}a − {R[1 − δ(d)] − R∗ −
˙ e
e
}xb − c + wl + κH, (4)
where π ≡ ˙ P/P,w,R∗, and κH denote the (consumption price) inﬂation rate, the real wage,
the foreign nominal interest rate, and real dividends from domestic ﬁrms, respectively. The
assumption of imperfect asset markets leads to the appearance of R[1 − δ(d)],w h i c hi s
the nominal home bond interest rate adjusted for the average risk of default; with positive
foreign debt, δ(d) > 0 and in equilibrium there must be a risk premium on the home
interest rate to exclude arbitrage opportunities (as e.g. in Turnovsky, 1997). No such








(R(v)[1 − δ(d)] − π(v))dv
¸
≥ 0.
The household’s ﬁrst order conditions for consumption, labor supply, foreign bonds, and













=R[1 − δ(d)] − π − ρ. (8)









(R(v)[1 − δ(d(v))] − π(v))dv
¸
=0 . (9)
Note that (7) is a modiﬁed version of an uncovered interest rate parity condition, where
the modiﬁcation consists of the fact that the level of external debt is relevant in determin-
ing whether domestic and foreign nominal interest rates satisfy arbitrage freeness, given
expectations of future nominal currency depreciation.

















, η > 1, 0 < ϑ < 1.













where PH and PF are the price indices of the domestically produced and foreign produced
consumption good, respectively, and the overall price index of consumption goods P at










Firms Intermediate production in the home country is conducted by a continuum of
monopolistically competitive ﬁrms each producing a diﬀerentiated intermediate good being
indexed on i ∈ [0,1]. Technology is linear in labor l,
yi = yH,i + yX
H,i = li, (13)
where yi is production of ﬁrm i, yH,i is production for the home market, and yX
H,i is exports.
Final goods producers are perfectly competitive and combine the diﬀerentiated intermedi-
ate inputs using a CES aggregation technology. The aggregators for total production for






















Intermediate ﬁrm i sets the price for its good PH,i in home currency (there is no pricing to
market with respect to the export market), taking into account that the ﬁnal producer’s























The optimal price setting decision of an intermediate producer is modelled as in Calvo [?]
and Yun [?]; the continuous time version used here is due to Benhabib et al. [?]. Firms
set prices to maximize a discounted stream of current and future real proﬁts. The nominal
rigidity is that ﬁrms may freely adjust prices in any given point in time only when they
receive a random signal that allows them to do so; otherwise, they must let their prices
mechanically grow with the steady state rate of domestic producer price inﬂation πH,
where πH ≡ ˙ PH/PH. The waiting time interval until the arrival of a random price-change
signal is assumed to follow an exponential distribution, such that the probability of not
being allowed to change prices between dates t and s>tis exp(−ξ[s−t]),w h e r eξ > 0 is a
parameter. Let Qt be the nominal price that ﬁrm i sets in period t if it receives the signal
permitting to freely adjust its price. Note that we write the problem for a general constant
returns to scale production function, which implies that total costs can be separated in
marginal costs and output, and perfect factor mobility ensures that marginal cost is a
function of aggregate nominal factor prices only and hence independent of ﬁrm speciﬁc
variables. Thus, all ﬁrms being allowed to adjust their prices will choose the same price,






exp{−(ξ+ρ)(s−t)}λs [(Qt exp{πH(s − t)}yis(Qt) − MCsyis(Qt))/PHs]ds, (16)
where MC is nominal marginal cost, given the initial price level PH0 > 0 and the de-
mand constraint (14). Note that the term in square brackets in (16) is real proﬁts as of
time s if the ﬁrm has last adjusted in time t, which is discounted with the probability
of not adjusting, and the pricing kernel λs exp{−ρ(s − t)} derived from the consumer’s
maximization problem; the maximization is subject to the ﬁrm’s demand constraint (14),
giving yis(Qt)=( Qt exp{πH(s − t)})−εPε





t exp{−(ξ + ρ)(s − t)}λs e Pε−1
Hs ys g MCsds
R ∞
t exp{−(ξ + ρ)(s − t)}λs e Pε−1
Hs ysds
,
w h e r ew ed e ﬁne e Xs ≡ Xs/exp{πH(s − t)},X = PH,MC. This ﬁrst order condition,
together with the price index (15), can be manipulated to give an approximate linear
diﬀerential equation for the evolution of aggregate home price inﬂation in the neighborhood
of a steady state, which we assume to exist and to have the property that home prices
6grow at the rate πH while all real variables are constant; in particular, real marginal cost
in the steady state will be the constant mcH ≡ MC/PH =( ε − 1)/ε < 1. Details of the
calculation can be found in appendix 5.1. The result is the linearized economy’s domestic
inﬂation equation, or Phillips curve, linking domestic producer price inﬂation πH to real
marginal costs deﬂated by home prices, mcH ≡ MC/PH,
˙ πH = ρ(πH − πH) − ξ(ξ + ρ)
ε
ε − 1
(mcH − mcH). (17)





and the symmetric aggregate production function is
y = yH + yX
H = l. (19)
Exchange rates and foreign demand Following Gali and Monacelli (2002), the home
country is assumed to be small in the sense that its exports to foreign are negligible in the
foreign price indices; thus, the foreign producer price level P∗
F is identical to the foreign
consumption price index P∗,
P∗ = P∗
F.
The law of one price is assumed to hold for every good, and the foreign country’s aggre-
gators are assumed to have the same structure as the home country ones, giving rise to
the relations
PH = eP∗
H,P F = eP∗
F,
where P∗
H is the price of home produced goods expressed in foreign currency. The terms





Due to the assumptions of smallness and the law of one price, the relation of domestic
producer prices to the consumer price index, PH/P, can be expressed as a function of the
terms of trade and the real exchange rate,
PH
P
= x · t. (21)
Following Kollmann (2001), we assume that the rest of the world has a demand for the
home country’s exports that can be expressed analogously to the domestic goods demand
functions. Speciﬁcally, let ϑ∗ > 0 be the weight of home produced goods in foreign’s
7consumption basket and η∗ > 1 be foreign’s demand elasticity (of course, ϑ∗ should be
‘small’ in the sense that foreign variables can still safely be regarded as exogenous by the









where c∗ is aggregate foreign consumption, which can be rewritten using the above as-




Given frictionless international trade in bonds and assuming that households in the rest






λ∗ =R∗ − π∗ − ρ. (23)
Using the uncovered nominal interest rate parity condition (7), the domestic household’s
intertemporal ﬁrst order condition for bond accumulation (8), and the growth rate of the
real exchange rate (from 3) ˙ x
x = ˙ e










Inserting the foreign and domestic households’ intertemporal ﬁrst order conditions on the
right hand side of (24) delivers a modiﬁed version of real interest rate parity,
˙ x
x
= e r − r∗, (25)
where the home and foreign real interest rates are deﬁned as
e r ≡ R[1 − δ(d)] − π (26)
and r∗ ≡ R∗ − π∗. This condition states that the default risk adjusted home real interest
rate, e r,i nt h es m a l lo p e ne c o n o m yc a nb eh i g h e rt h a nt h ew o r l dr e a li n t e r e s tr a t eo n l yi fa
future real depreciation (˙ x/x > 0) is impending. The unadjusted home real interest rate,
r ≡ R−π, will, however, be larger than r∗ even for zero future real exchange rate growth,
because it positively depends on δ, and therefore on real debt d. Noteworthily, the implied
negative relationship between real net foreign assets and the home real interest rate (or
8its diﬀerence with respect to the world interest rate) is precisely what is found empirically
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) in their cross-country panel data set.
Central bank The central bank is assumed to set the nominal interest rate in reaction to
the domestic producer price inﬂation rate πH ≡ ˙ PH/PH (domestic inﬂation, henceforth).
Furthermore, the central bank bases its interest rate setting decisions on the real exchange
rate x a n dt h el e v e lo fr e a ln e tf o r e i g na s s e t sb, such that its policy rule reads
R = R(πH,x,b) > 0,R 1 ≥ 0,R 2,R 3 R 0, (27)
where Rj (j =1 ,...,3) is the ﬁrst partial derivative of the interest rate rule with respect
to its j-th argument. Furthermore, the interest rate rule in (27) is restricted such that
the steady state condition R(1 − δ(d)) = ρ + π > 0 has a solution for a positive nominal
interest rate.
Perfect foresight equilibrium In equilibrium all markets clear, implying cH = yH,
cF = yF,a n dA = eB. The aggregate resource constraint is then
y = c + x[˙ b − r∗b]. (28)
A perfect foresight equilibrium is a set of sequences {c, l, λ,R , ˙ e





0 satisfying the households’ ﬁrst order conditions (5) to (8), the optimality
condition of domestic ﬁrms (17) and (18), the aggregate domestic production function
(19), the optimality conditions for domestic and foreign demand for domestically produced
goods (10) and (22), the smallness implication for the foreign price level (PF = eP∗), the
interest rate rule (27), the foreign ﬁrst order condition for bonds (23), the domestic budget
constraints consolidated to the aggregate resource constraint (28), and the transversality
condition (9), given the deﬁnitions of the CPI price level (12), the real exchange rate (3),
the terms of trade (7), real foreign debt given (2), and given initial values of households’
ﬁnancial wealth, A0, and the price level of domestically produced goods, PH0.
Note that international risk sharing implies that the steady state current account
y − c = −xr∗b is constant, since it implies that domestic consumption is proportional to
foreign consumption, and therefore to the real exchange rate and thus output (see also
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2002). As we want to present results for a version with perfect
international capital markets (i.e. no default risk) as a background for comparison, we
need to make sure that even in that case the household transversality condition (9) is not
violated, which implies that the discounted stock of real foreign bonds held by domestic
households must asymptotically converge to zero. Given that b grows asymptotically at
the rate r∗, as implied by the aggregate resource constraint (28), it is suﬃcient to assume
9that the initial value for the stock of domestically held foreign bonds equals zero (B0 =0 ),
which together with the risk-sharing implication that the current account is asymptotically
ﬁnite ensures that the discounted stock of foreign bonds converges asymptotically to zero.
Note that in the model with imperfect capital markets, i.e. with a non-zero default risk
as presented so far, no such assumption is needed, since a stable equilibrium path implies
a ﬁnite solution for b anyway. The assumption does, however, not limit the generality of
the results.
In order to analyze the local dynamics, the model is linearized around the steady
state (see appendix 5.2 for details). The real exchange rate is normalized to equal one
in the steady state, implying, together with the smallness assumption (PF = eP∗), that
all home currency price levels are equal in the steady state (PH = PF = P), such that
yH = cH =( 1− ϑ)c, and yX
H = y − yH = {y − (1 − ϑ)c}.
The precise steps of the linearization are given in appendix 5.3 for convenience. The




x[1 − δ(d)](R − R) − x(πH − πH)+Rδ0xb(x − x)+Rδ0x2(b−b)
o
,(29)
˙ πH =ρ(πH − πH) −
ψ
x
(x − x), (30)
˙ b=
1
x2 [(ϕ − 1)y +( 1− 1/σ)c](x − x)+ρ(b−b), (31)
where ψ ≡ ξ(ξ + ρ) 1
















> 0, and the steady
state condition r∗ = ρ has been used. The deviation from steady state of the nominal
interest rate, (R − R), is to be substituted by the linearized version of the central banks
monetary policy rule from (27).
Deﬁnition 1 A perfect foresight equilibrium of the linear approximation to the model is
a set of sequences {x,πH,b} satisfying (29), (30), and (31), a linearized version of (27),
and (9), given PH0 > 0, B0 =0 .
3R e s u l t s
3.1 Perfect asset markets
For comparison, we ﬁrst present a model version where there are no capital market im-
perfections, and hence no default risk on bonds, i.e. δ = δ0 =0 .1 The assumption of
international risk sharing allows to solve separately for the accumulation of foreign bonds,
1This version of the model is identical to the one in Gali and Monacelli (2002). The stability result
together with the one for a variant where the CPI inﬂation rate π ≡ ˙ P/P enters the policy rule is discussed
in Linnemann and Schabert (2001).
10since with perfect capital markets b does not aﬀect the other endogenous variables of the
system (29) to (30). Assuming that the central bank only considers domestic inﬂation
when formulating its interest rate policy2, the relevant linearized version of (27) is
R − R = α(πH − πH), (32)
where α > 0 is the central bank’s reaction coeﬃcient. Inserting this into (29) and applying
δ = δ
0 =0gives
˙ x =( 1− ϑ)x(α − 1)(πH − πH). (33)
The approximate equilibrium system then consists of the two jump variables x,πH,a n di s
given by (33) and (30). It turns out that as in the case of a closed economy, equilibrium
determinacy requires interest rate policy to react more than one-to-one to inﬂation (i.e.
to be ‘active’, see e.g. Woodford, 2001). The following proposition summarizes the result,
which can also be found in Linnemann and Schabert (2001).
Proposition 1 When capital markets are perfect, the equilibrium is locally saddle path
stable if α > 1.










, with A ≡
Ã




Since both variables can jump, a uniquely determined saddle path stable equilibrium
requires that A has two unstable (positive) eigenvalues (see Blanchard and Kahn, 1980).
Since trace(A)=ρ > 0 and det(A)=( 1− ϑ)ψ(α − 1),t h i si sf u l ﬁlled with α > 1,w h i l e
in the opposite case (α < 1) there is one stable and one unstable eigenvalue.¥
Thus, active policy (α > 1) implies a unique perfect foresight equilibrium path of (x,
πH) converging to the steady state, namely the steady state itself. For a passive policy
rule (α < 1), there are inﬁnitely many perfect foresight equilibrium paths. This result is
familiar from the closed-economy literature, where it has been named the Taylor principle
(in honor of Taylor, 1993; see e.g. Woodford, 2001). Its essence is that the central
bank is stabilizing the economy if it ties inﬂation to the real interest rate, by raising the
nominal rate more than one-to-one when inﬂation changes. Thereby, it also stabilizes the
real exchange rate and aggregate demand. To see why, assume that the exchange rate
were initially undervalued. Since prices are sticky temporarily, this implies that the real
2See below section 3.3 for the case when also the exchange rate and foreign assets appear in the policy
rule.
11exchange rate, too, is above its long run steady state, x>x. Perfect foresight informs
agents that there is a future real appreciation needed to bring x back into the steady
state. As this will imply a future drop in consumer prices through the decrease in the
prices of imported items, there is negative future growth in real wage costs of ﬁrms and
thus in domestic inﬂation. Along a stable equilibrium path, domestic inﬂation must thus
be currently high according to the Phillips curve. If the central bank reacts strongly to
the domestic inﬂation increase in the sense α > 1, the home real interest rate (both in the
sense R−πH and R−π)i sr a i s e d . 3 Thus, given the constant world real interest rate r∗,a
future real depreciation (˙ x/x > 0) is implied by the real interest rate parity condition for
arbitrage freeness, which with perfect international capital markets is diﬀerent from (25)
in that it reads R − π = r∗ + ˙ x
x in this case. The real exchange rate would thus explode,
which is exactly what is required for saddle path stability: since the system contains only
jump variables, and thus exhibits no sluggishness, the adjustment takes place in an instant,
and x could never leave the steady state. In the opposite case if the central bank were
passive, i.e. α < 1, any arbitrary deviation of the real exchange rate from its steady state
is compatible with a perfect foresight equilibrium, since the real interest rate is lowered
through inﬂation and return of the x to the steady state is supported from arbitrary intitial
positions. In this case, there is equilibrium indeterminacy with the associated possibility
of arbitrary ﬂuctuations through self-fulﬁlling prophecies.
3.2 Imperfect asset markets
We now return to the imperfect capital market case with 0 < δ < 1 and δ0 ≥ 0.T h e
maintained assumption that the home country is a net debtor to the world capital market,
in the sense that its stock of net foreign assets b is negative. We begin with the case
where the central bank only looks at the domestic inﬂation rate πH when formulating
its interest rate policy, and defer an alternative speciﬁcation to a later section. In what
follows, it turns out to be useful to restrict the elasticity of the probability (1 − δ)o fn o t





1−δ.A s s u m i n gt h a tεd < e ε where e ε is the upper bound e ε ≡ 2
(1−ϑ)(π/ρ+1) not
only rules out inessential complications, but also serves to highlight our argument that
the impact of foreign debt on macroeconomic stability is a qualitative one, and the theory
does not at all rely on quantitively large changes in debt. The following proposition states
the main stability result.
3Proof: Using (44) and (46) from appendix 5.3 in (25) shows that R − π and R − πH diﬀer only by a
constant.
12Proposition 2 Suppose capital markets are imperfect, the home country is a net debtor
(d>0) and the variability of the default probability is suﬃciently low to satisfy εd < e ε.




,w h e r e Γ ≡ δ0R
ψ
[ϕy − (1/σ)c] > 0.
Otherwise, there is no equilibrium path converging to the steady state.





































where Φ1 ≡ (1−ϑ)Rδ0x ≥ 0, Φ2 ≡ (1−ϑ)x{[1−δ(d)]α−1}, Φ3 ≡ 1
x2[(ϕ−1)y+(1−1/σ)c],
and the second equality sign deﬁnes the ﬁxed coeﬃcients matrix F.
Since the model consists of two jump variables x,πH and the predetermined state vari-
able b, a uniquely determined saddle path stable equilibrium requires that one eigenvalue
of the coeﬃcient matrix F is stable (negative), while the two others are unstable (positive)
(see Blanchard and Kahn, 1980). A suﬃcient condition for this to hold is trace(F) > 0
and det(F) < 0. Using the steady state condition R =
π+ρ
1−δ and d = −xb,w ec a nw r i t e
trace(F)=b(1 − ϑ)Rδ0x +2 ρ = −εd(1 − ϑ)(π + ρ)+2 ρ, such that the assumed upper
bound εd < 2
(1−ϑ)(π/ρ+1) ensures that trace(F) > 0. The determinant of F, which is given
by det(F)=−(1 − ϑ){Rδ0ρ[ϕy − (1/σ)c] − ρψ
¡
[1 − δ]α − 1
¢
}, is strictly negative if
det(F) < 0 ⇔ α[1 − δ] < 1+
Rδ0
ψ
[ϕy − (1/σ)c]. (34)
The term in square brackets on the right hand side of (34) is positive, since the assumption
of a net debtor country implies a positive current account ca = y−c = −ρxb in the steady
state, such that y>c,a n dt h ec o e ﬃcient ϕ can be shown to satisfy ϕ > 1
σ.T h u s , t h e
right hand side of (34) is positive and larger than one. Hence, if α fulﬁlls (34), there is
exactly one stable eigenvalue, and the equilibrium is saddle path stable.
If, in contrast, α is such that det(F) > 0, there are either two or zero stable eigenvalues.
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bΦ1 + ρ 0 −xΦ1





13(with fij the (i,j)-element of F). Obviously, this requires
[1 − δ]α > 1+
Rδ0
ψ









w h e r ew eu s e dy −c = −ρb and x =1 . Given that the term in the square brackets equals
ρ
1−ϑtrace(F) > 0,( 3 5 )i si m p l i e db ydet(F) > 0. Hence, if α violates (34), there are zero
stable eigenvalues, and the equilibrium is explosive.
The proposition states that the central bank’s interest rate policy must not be too ag-
gressively trying to ﬁght inﬂation with higher nominal interest rates if the economy’s
equilibrium is to be (saddle path) stable. Otherwise, with a high inﬂation reaction co-
eﬃcient α, the equilibrium will be explosive, in the sense that there is no path of the
endogenous variables converging to the steady state. While in general the critical value
for α depends on a host of parameters, there is a more easily interpretable conclusion for
the intuitively appealing case that the steady state default risk probability δ(d) is only
marginally, or asymptotically not at all, changing with the level of foreign debt, i.e. δ
0 → 0.
This is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 3 If the default risk approaches a constant, δ0 → 0, the equilibrium is saddle
path stable if α < 1/[1 − δ],a n de x p l o s i v eo t h e r w i s e .
This result can easily be linked to the one stated above in the context of perfect capital
markets, since if we assume that the steady state default risk is not large, the critical
threshold for α should be close to one, hence to the borderline that subdivides the outcomes
of saddle path stability (α > 1) and indeterminacy (α < 1) in the perfect capital markets
case. Viewed in this way, the main result is that the presence of imperfect capital markets
implies that stability requires a departure from the Taylor principle in that weak interest
rate reactions to inﬂation on the part of the central bank are associated with saddle path
stability, and strong reactions lead to explosiveness, while indeterminacy cannot occur.
Why does the attempt of the central bank to stabilize inﬂation through higher nominal
interest rates result in destabilization in the present model? The reason is the nature
of the impact of net foreign assets on the economy. Assume an initial exchange rate
undervaluation, i.e. a real exchange rate larger than its steady state value, x>x. Note
that the default risk depends on x through the deﬁnition of foreign debt, δ(d)=δ(−xb),
such that when linearized at the steady state
δ − δ = −bδ
0(x − x) − xδ
0(b − b).
14Since we are considering the case of an indebted country, net foreign assets b are assumed
to be negative at the steady state, such that a larger than steady state real exchange rate
x−x>0 raises the current burden of real foreign indebtedness, and thus the default risk
probability δ. This means that, ceteris paribus, the risk adjusted real home interest rate
e r ≡ R[1 − δ(d)] − π is currently relatively low, compared to its steady state value. From
the modiﬁed real interest rate parity conditon (25), given the foreign real interest rate, a
l o w e rt h a ns t e a d ys t a t ev a l u eo fe r must (to satisfy arbitrage freeness) be associated with an
anticipation of a future decline in the real exchange rate x, i.e. a future real appreciation
(˙ x/x < 0). This is precisely what is required for the real exchange rate to return to the
steady state from above.
The important issue to note is that this stabilizing mechanism of the role of net foreign
assets works without the interference of interest rate policy. In the present model, there
is an inherently stabilizing negative feedback in the real exchange rate, in the sense that
∂ ˙ x/∂(x − x) < 0 as just described. As the real exchange rate and net foreign assets
aﬀect the modiﬁed real interest rate parity condition (25), it is possible that stability is
brought about by these variables only, without any need for the central bank to adjust
the nominal interest rate. Since the model (in contrast to the version with perfect capital
markets discussed in an earlier section) contains a predetermined state variable, namely
foreign assets b, this return to steady state of the real exchange rate is precisely what is
needed for stability: any time when x is out of steady state real debt is, too, there must
be an endogenous mechanism that brings back x to the steady state (with an implied
overshooting to ensure a constant steady state value b), because otherwise b would shrink
indeﬁnitely with the rate of the world real interest rate.
To clarify the role of interest rate policy in the present model, we continue the example
of initial real exchange rate undervaluation x − x>0. From the supply side of the
economy, expressed in the Phillips curve, a higher than steady state real exchange rate is
associated with currently high domestic inﬂation, πH − πH > 0. The reason is the usual
aggregate demand eﬀect of a high real exchange rate, which promotes export demand and
consumption, raising employment, labor costs, and thus domestic producer prices. Now
assume the central bank were actively trying to counteract the inﬂationary pressure by
raising the nominal interest rate strongly. The precise meaning of a ‘strong’ interest rate
reaction is that the central bank policy parameter α is high enough to raise the real interest
rate and thus violate the condition in proposition 2. By implication, the risk adjusted real
interest rate e r is increased ceteris paribus, too. From the modiﬁed real interest rate parity
condition (25), in equilibrium there must be an anticipated future growth in x, i.e. a
future real depreciation. Since the starting point was that x was higher than steady state,
this will remove x even farther from steady state. Hence, the central bank reaction would
15set the economy on an explosive path where an initial real overvaluation is perpetually
reinforced, which feeds an unbounded growth of foreign debt.
If, on the other hand, the central bank were not aggressively raising the interest rate
i nt h ew a k eo fi n ﬂation, the real interest rate would decline. This would allow the real
exchange rate to appreciate over time, and thus return to the steady state. It is, from the
pure point of view of stability, therefore not necessary for the central bank to react at all
to changes in inﬂation. Put diﬀerently, a situation of high aggregate demand cures itself
without change in the nominal interest rate. As usual, high aggregate demand implies
positive inﬂation and a low real interest rate. In the present model, however, this also
implies that the high export demand generates current account surpluses that help to
reduce foreign indebtedness. This makes domestic debt less risky, such that international
capital markets will accept require a lower rate of return for holding it. With lower default
risk, the risk adjusted real interest rate e r is higher for any given nominal interest rate and
inﬂation rate, which brings aggregate demand back to normal through the associated real
appreciation.
3 . 3 W h e nt h ec e n t r a lb a n kr e a c t so nn e tf o r e i g na s s e t s
So far, the central bank has been assumed only to react to inﬂation changes according to
(32). On the other hand, the model’s essence is that foreign debt is crucial to stability. A
well informed central bank would thus probably be inclined to base its interest rate setting
decisions on the whole set of relevant variables. This is what we assume in this section by
postulating the general version of the policy rule from (27), which in linearized form reads
(R − R)=α(πH − πH)+κ(d−d) (36)
=α(πH − πH) − κb(x−x) − κx(b−b).
N o t et h a tw el e a v et h es i g no fκ open; since b < 0, an assumption κ > 0 would imply that
the nominal interest rate is raised if real foreign debt rises, i.e. if the exchange rate has
depreciated in real terms or if net foreign assets have decreased.
Inserting (36) into equilibrium condition (29) leads to
˙ x = bΦ4(x − x)+Φ2(πH − πH)+xΦ4(b−b), (37)
with Φ4 ≡ (1 − ϑ)x
h
Rδ0 − κ[1 − δ(d)]
i
= Φ1 − κx(1 − ϑ)[1 − δ(d)]. The basic intuition
for the eﬀect of the more general policy rule can be seen from this expression. Recall that
above it has been argued that the model’s stability properties depend crucially on the
feedback in the real exchange rate which in the case where the central bank only targets
inﬂation ensures ∂ ˙ x/∂(x − x) < 0, and thus ensures a return of the real exchange rate to
16its steady state. If, however, the central bank targets foreign debt, it reacts directly to the
real exchange rate by implication, such that it can break this stabilizing link between the
level of x and its change, since ∂ ˙ x/∂(x−x)=bΦ4 can be of either sign. In particular, since
b < 0, a large positive value of κ can render this expression positive, which according to the
intuition set out above should result in an unstable outcome. The following proposition
summarizes the main stability result.
Proposition 4 If capital markets are imperfect and the home country is a net debtor
(d>0), the likelihood that the necessary condition for saddle path stability is satisﬁed
declines with κ.





































where the second equality sign deﬁndes the ﬁxed coeﬃcients matrix Fd. A uniquely
determined saddle path stable equilibrium again requires that Fd has one negative and
two positive eigenvalues. A necessary condition for this to hold is that det(Fd) < 0,w h i c h
is the case if and only if
[1 − δ]α < 1+Γ − κ(1 − δ(d))(ϕy − c/σ)/ψ,
with Γ ≡ δ0 R
ψ [ϕy − (1/σ)c] > 0 deﬁned as above. Since (1 − δ(d)) 1
ψ (ϕy − c/σ) > 0,t h e
right hand side is declining in κ.
Thus, a positive reaction to an increase in foreign debt makes the range of values of the
inﬂation targeting coeﬃcient α that are compatible with stability smaller. The intuition
for this result again builds on the role of foreign debt in the real interest rate parity
condition (25): if the real exchange rate is higher than in steady state, the real value of
foreign debt is high, the default risk δ of domestic creditors is accordingly high, and the
risk adjusted real interest rate e r is low, for any given nominal interest rate. While this
alone would imply that a stabilizing future real apprection (˙ x/x < 0)i si m p e n d i n gt h a t
would return x t oi t ss t e a d ys t a t e ,t h ec e n t r a lb a n km a yb r e a kt h i sc h a i no fe v e n t sb y
targeting foreign debt with a positive reaction coeﬃcient κ > 0.I fi td o e ss o ,n a m e l y ,i t
would raise the nominal interest rate R when x is higher than steady state, which ceteris
paribus would raise the risk adjusted real interest rate e r.I ft h ee ﬀect is strong enough, the
stabilizing real appreciation that in the absence of central bank action would be induced
17through a high real value of foreign debt is counteracted, and the model may become
unstable.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper extends the line of research on the local dynamic properties of sticky-price mod-
els with monetary policy characterized by nominal interest rate rules for the case of small
open economies. We consider the case of imperfect asset markets due to the the existence
of default risk on debt emissions, where the probability of default is assumed to depend on
the aggregate stock of foreign debt. While in the absence of this capital market imperfec-
tion saddle path stability requires interest rate policy to satisfy the Taylor-principle (as in
the case of closed economies), the same priniciple of aggressive inﬂation targeting bears the
danger of unbounded debt growth if default risk depends on indebtedness. Hence, when
asset markets are imperfect the central bank should either refrain from actively targeting
domestic inﬂation, e.g., by choosing a nominal interest rate peg, or consider the evolution
of net foreign assets as an argument of its interest rate policy rule. In particular, it is
shown that the central bank can raise the likelihood for the equilibrium to be saddle path
stable if it allows the nominal interest rate to respond negatively to changes in net foreign
debt.
185 Appendix
5.1 Derivation of the Phillips curve





e−(ξ+ρ)(s−t)λs[(QteπH(s−t)yis(Qt) − MCsyis(Qt))/PHs]ds. (38)
























Hs ys g MCsds,
w h e r ew ed e ﬁne e Xs ≡ Xs/eπH(s−t),X = PH,MC. Dividing both sides by PHt and
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where, as usual, bars over variables denote the respective steady state values. Note that,
in steady state, we have the following relations: PHs grows with the rate π, whereas
e PHs is constant (as are λs and ys). Further, the price chosen by an adjusting ﬁrm must
equal the aggregate price index, such that qt =1 . The constant elasticity property of
the demand function implies that the steady state price level is a constant markup over
nominal marginal costs, PHs = ε/(ε−1)MCs. Therefore, as PHs = PHteπH(s−t), we have
that ε/(ε − 1) g MCs/PHt =1 , and the coeﬃcients on the left and right hand sides of (39)

















Noting that ( g MCs− g MCs)/ g MCs =( MCs−MCs)/MCs and deﬁning real marginal costs
as mcHs = MCs/PHs, this can be written as
qt − qt
qt












The last term in square brackets in the preceding expression is a function of the deviations
of the inﬂation rates between t and s from steady state inﬂation, as from PHs/PHt =
exp(
R s
t πHrdr) it follows that (PHs/PHt − PHs/PHt)/PHs/PHt =
R s
t (πHr − πH)dr. Using





























− (πHt − πHt). (41)
This can be converted into a diﬀerential equation in πH by ﬁnding the relation between,
respectively, the steady state deviations and the growth rates of inﬂation and the real reset
price. First, the price index (15) can be expressed as a function of past reset prices, where
each historical reset price has to be weighted by the probability that a price set at time s
is not adjusted in time t,w h i c hi sg i v e nb yξ exp{−ξ(t − s)} (see Calvo, 1983, Benhabib







Diﬀerentiating with respect to t,w eg e t
πHt = ξ(qt − 1),
which when linearized around the steady state implies
πHt − πHt = ξ(qt − qt). (42)
20Using (42) in (41) and noting that qt =1and mcHt =( ε − 1)/ε,t h i sﬁnally results in




This is the linearized economy’s domestic inﬂation equation.
5.2 Steady state
Imposing stationarity for endogenous variables, the steady state values for consumption,
output, foreign debt, the real exchange rate, and CPI inﬂation satisfy
γl
γ−1 =[(² − 1)/²]c−σ,
y =c − xρb,
ρ=R(πH)[1 − δ(−xb)] − π = r∗,





λ ⇒ c = ζc∗, where ζ
denotes an arbitary constant, output is pinned down by the ﬁrst condition, y = {[(² −
1)/²γ](ζc∗)−σ}
1
γ−1, foreign debt by the resource constraint, b =( ζc∗ − y)/ρ,w h i l et h e
modiﬁed UIP condition delivers the inﬂation rate through π/R(π)=[ 1− δ(−b)] − ρ.
5.3 Linearization
From the deﬁnitions of the terms of trade (20) and the CPI (12), the steady state deviations







Diﬀerentiating (43) and the terms of trade deﬁnition (20) with respect to time allows to
ﬁnd an approximate linear relation between the growth in the terms of trade t and the
domestic inﬂation rate πH and the CPI inﬂation rate π,




Using PF/P = x, which follows from the real exchange rate deﬁnition (3) considering
smallness of the economy (P∗ = P∗
F)a n dt h el a wo fo n ep r i c e( PF = eP∗
F), we obtain








21Diﬀerentiating with respect to time gives
˙ x
x



























Using the linearized demand conditions for domestic goods (10) and for exported goods































Integrating (24), which after inserting the static ﬁrst order condition for consumption, (5),











From now on, foreign variables (those with an asterisk) are taken as constant, and their
steady state deviations or growth rates are, therefore, set to zero. Hence, consumption



























Note that the sign of ϕ follows from the maintained assumption c ≤ y. Combination of
the linearized ﬁrst order conditions for labor (6) and consumption (5) yields
w − w
w







which together with the linearized labor demand function (18) and (43), allows to eliminate
real marginal cost by







, ψ ≡ ξ(ξ + ρ)
1
1 − ϑ
+(γ − 1)ϕ > 0,
where we used that mcH = ²−1
² holds, in the inﬂation equation (17), yielding
˙ πH = ρ(πH − πH) −
ψ
x
(x − x). (51)
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